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This article analyses the impact ASEAN’s expansion to include the +3 countries of China, 
Japan and South Korea. By placing post-97 developments in a chronological and sectoral 
matrix, this article attempts to evaluate ASEAN’s recent efforts at region-building. It is argued 
that the expansion of ASEAN’s Informal membership coupled with a higher level of policy 
convergence by ASEAN member countries at the regional and sub-regional levels is leading 
towards the development of an East Asian bloc. The choice now confronting these countries is 
whether to institutionalize the current arrangements or to allow the present, looser formation 
to continue.   
 
A new East Asia is being built: one with stronger financial institutions and 
corporations and one where openness applies not just to trade and finance but 
increasingly to information and even politics. 
                                                                        The World Bank Annual Report 1999 
 
 
[It is] clear that ASEAN is moving, as it must, toward closer economic integration 
and tighter, firmer, more institutionalized collaboration on a growing host of 
transnational issues that beset the region as a whole. The pressures of globalization, 
the forces of technology, the growing interdependence of economies, the heightened 
competition for markets and investments, and the increasing severity of transnational 
problems demand it. 
Remarks by ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino at the European Policy Center  





East Asia is coming together.  Spurred on by the 1997 financial crisis, the leaders of the 
thirteen countries are taking steps to ensure a return to regional prosperity and stability. The 
consensus has emerged that the best way to achieve this is to be in a more cohesive 
relationship. 
With the financial crisis as the catalyst the first wave of reforms have focused on 
strengthening regional economic and financial systems. However, just as the financial crisis 
was not limited to monetary sectors but spread to the social and political sectors, regional 
leaders are now forging closer ties in the areas of security, the environment, policy 
development and social welfare.  
This article argues that these reforms indicate a profound sea-change in regional 
cooperation among East Asia countries. Taken together, these efforts demonstrate an 
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ideological and practical commitment to enhanced regional integration. Although this 
commitment is generally described as a mechanism to alleviate (and prevent a repetition of) 
the profound economic and social distress that cascaded through the region post 1997 it will 
be shown that the cumulative effect of these efforts is leading to a greater sense of identity - 
supported by strong regional ties in the political, economic and social sectors. Whether these 
new regional efforts takes the form of a Community, bound together in a set of formal 
overlapping institutions with some loss of sovereignty, or a community, where a coalition of 
national interests come together to meet specific functional objectives in a regional context 
without the loss of sovereignty, will be determined by agreements now being made. 
In addressing the central question of this article it will be necessary to first examine the 
types of regional integration that are already in place before analysing the characteristics of 
region building efforts in East Asia. In particular, it will be shown how the 1997 financial 
crisis has created a new sense of urgency in regional relations. Once these characteristics are 
understood, the different ways (monetary, political, social and strategic) they might be used 
to realize a C/community will be investigated. It will be argued that regional integration is 
occurring simultaneously at the regional and sub-regional levels as well as across different 
functional communities. Although this may present a haphazard approach to region-building 
strategies, this article will demonstrate that the cumulative effect of these diverse approaches 
is to enhance East Asian regionalization processes. Following this a number of the 
challenges facing East Asian countries in their efforts towards building a region will be 




2. FORMS OF REGIONALISM 
 
2.1. Old and New Regionalism 
 
In analysing the regional initiatives currently being enacted or mooted it is important to 
distinguish between what has gone on before, the new developments and the most recent 
changes.  Old regionalism was characterized by the rapid expansion of regional organisations 
and institutions in the 1950s and 1960s.  Although primarily centred on the development of 
the European Community, it also encompassed the creation of the Organisation of American 
States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Organisation of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).  The decline in this first wave of regionalism was 
“due both to the previous slow-down in West European integration, leading to the Euro-
pessimism of the 1970s, and the almost universal failure of Third World Free Trade areas” 
(Hettne 1999: 9). 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s new regional associations emerged. Outside the 
Western or European domain these new associations sought to promote a commonality of 
needs and beliefs based upon geographically defined areas of interest. The development of 
ASEAN (1967), ECOWAS (1975) and SADCC (1980) are three examples of this new 
regionalism.2 Importantly these regional associations were all formed against the backdrop of 
the Cold War, with its bipolar realist political and economic structures and the emphasis on 
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military strength as the key determinant of a state’s power. The creation of these new 
associations placed them, to a limited extent, outside the bipolar power structures, allowing 
them to develop partially homogenized governance structures that differentiated them from 
other, non-regionalized nation-states (Hettne 1999: 7). 
The end of the Cold War led to a fundamental change in international cooperation. The 
bipolar world that existed up until 1989 contained structural disincentives against 
interdependent relations based primarily on economic or social needs. The shift to a 
multiplicity of global and regional power centres created opportunities for integration and 
interdependency, especially in the areas of economics and security (Mastandumo 1998: 827). 
In particular the end of the Cold War in East Asia generated proposals for regional and sub-
regional organisations based on expanded economic and commercial linkages (Akaha 1999a: 
1).  A good example of this is the deepening economic relationships between China, Vietnam 
and Laos, and their non-communist Asian neighbours. A more recent example, at the sub-
regional level, which has its roots in the decline of Cold War tensions in Asia, is the growth 
in diplomatic and economic ties between South Korea and North Korea, and between North 
Korea and most members of ASEAN.3  In both examples deepening state-level ties were 
supported by numerous efforts across a variety of commercial sectors. 
 




New regionalism represents a deepening of existing regional organisations and 
institutions.  Since the mid 1990s there has been such a rapid acceleration of regional 
linkages in East Asia as to constitute a new phase in regional development. This current 
phase (or third wave) has been termed ‘new new regionalism’. As Wesley (2000) wrote , 
 
This is characterised by significant new movements in organisational widening and 
deepening around the world.  In the Americas, it has come in the form of talks on a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas; in Europe with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the launch of the euro and the 
debates on expansion to include Eastern European countries. In East Asia, its most obvious 
manifestation has been the burgeoning “ASEAN + 3” process, involving ASEAN in regular 
and increasingly institutionalised discussions with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China 
(Wesley 2000: 3). 
 
The last decade saw an upsurge in the level of integration within the East Asian region.  
Triggered by the end of the Cold War, the creation of regional political and trade blocs and 
the politico-economic implications of the Asian financial crisis, countries in Northeast and 
Southeast Asia began to rapidly develop a series of informal and formal linkages. As 
Malaysian Minister for Foreign Affairs Syed Hamid Albar (1999) observed: 
 
I believe Southeast Asia will need to forge even stronger bonds with countries of Northeast 
Asia …. As underscored by the Asian Financial Crisis, the destiny of Southeast Asian countries 
is inextricably linked to its Northeast Asian neighbours. It behoves East Asian countries to 
consult together on problems confronting the region, evolve common understanding and 
approaches (Intan Address 12 August). 
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The unification of Western Europe into the European Union (in 1993), and its subsequent 
expansion south and eastwards, as well as the creation of NAFTA (in 1992) highlighted in 
absentia the need for a regional bloc in East Asia (Cheong 1999: 51; Akaha 1999b: 28-49).  
Although ASEAN already existed, it did not encompass all ten Southeast Asian countries.  
Furthermore, there was no corresponding formation in Northeast Asia nor were there 
channels for the engagement of both China and Japan in regional processes outside of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In terms of 
establishing a regional integrative process the inclusion of both China and Japan is necessary.  
In the case of China, its inclusion in a regional regime on an equal footing with other 
regional states helps allay strategic and economic concerns. Whereas Japan’s inclusion 
allows for the harnessing of its investment potential whilst helping to overcome historical 
tensions within a consensual framework. 
The development of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) dialogue in 1996 created extra-
regional pressures for the development of an East Asian bloc. ASEM helped the process by 
including China, Japan and South Korea in a dialogue with 7 ASEAN states. This was the 
first time that the Northeast Asian countries had been grouped with their Southeast Asian 
counterparts in a discrete Asian bloc.4  The advantages of this type of forum in part led, in 
1996, to the first ASEAN Informal meeting.  Designed to be a forum for all East Asian states 
to come together to discuss issues of regional concern it was slow to take off, partly because 
of a lack of Northeast Asian interest but also as a result of ASEAN (at that stage) not 
representing all Southeast Asian countries. It was not until the second Informal Meeting 
(1998) that representatives of Northeast Asian countries joined their Southeast Asian 
colleagues, in what has become known as the ASEAN +3 process. This process seeks to 
coordinate public policies in regional countries across a broad range of sectors (monetary, 
political and social) whilst developing new initiatives for regional development. Most 
recently, the initiation of the East Asian Latin American Forum (EALAF) (1999) has again 
established a pan-regional dialogue that groups East Asia countries into a regional bloc. 
At the same time as ASEAN was coming together the Thai government devalued the baht, 
triggering the Asian financial crisis. The crisis served to reinforce the message that 
interdependence could have a negative as well as a positive aspect. On the one hand, in 
Southeast Asia, this had already been noted with the spread of the haze from uncontrolled 
forest and plantation burn-offs in Indonesia in early 1997. However, the exposure of Hong 
Kong and South Korean companies and economies to the crisis-hit countries as well as the 
pressure placed on the Chinese yuan demonstrated the extent to which monetary integration 
had already developed, without due regard for overarching, stabilising agreements. ASEAN 
Secretary General Rodolfo Severino (1999) noted, “One painful but invaluable lesson from 
the current economic difficulties is that in this age of globalisation, nations can thrive and 
flourish only if they band together for common purposes.” 
This decision by ASEAN--to band more effectively together and to expand the 
Association’s Informal membership to encompass Japan, China, and South Korea--is what 
has led to the third wave of regionalism in East Asia.  
The ‘third wave’ of region building efforts in East Asia is characterized by a high er 
degree of policy coordination between regional countries across a wide range of sectors.  It is 
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not simply economics ministers developing regional economic strategies. Rather, it is 
economic ministers developing strategies in coordination with their financial and foreign 
affairs ministerial colleagues.  It is ministers responsible for social policy, working with their 
labour and health colleagues to develop strategies for coping with the social repercussions of 
the financial crisis on a regional rather than domestic level.5  In addition, more intense forms 
of policy coordination are visible at subregional levels, such as the Greater Mekong 
Subregion, providing further impetus to East Asian regionalization efforts. These state-level 
processes are being supported by increased regional interaction within the private sector and 
civil society, generating supporting functional momentum for regional integration across a 
range of sectors. 
When analyzing the forms this third wave can take, it is necessary to remember that there 
can be inter-sectoral coordination.  For ease of reference the following two sections seek to  
maintain a degree of separation between the economic and financial regionalism on one hand; 
and political, social, and strategic processes on the other hand. However, some inter-
referencing is unavoidable. 
 
2.2.2. The Third Wave of Economic and Financial Regionalism 
 
The Asian financial crisis was the catalyst for the rapid change now witnessed in the 
region. Thus it is not surprising that the engine of regional integration is financial and 
economic in nature. Not only are these areas of immediate and overlapping need for the 
countries of East Asia but focusing on economics and finance allows the different 
participants to interact without conflicting socio-political or cultural positions being taken 
into account. 
Even before the 1997, crisis preliminary steps had already been taken to promote regional 
monetary integration. In 1991 eleven regional central banks formed a network known as 
EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia -Pacific Central Banks).6 Between 1991 and 1996, 
EMEAP was primarily concerned with network building and information exchange at the 
Deputy Governor level.  In 1996 in light of increased regional interdependence, the first 
Governor’s meeting was held and two working groups as well as a study group were 
established to find ways of “strengthening cooperation to enhance financial stability and 
market developments in the region” (EMEAP Press Release July 1996). 
The importance of the network and the utility of having a regional aspect to central bank 
policies was demonstrated immediately prior to the devaluation of the baht. Before the 
decision to devalue the baht was taken a scheduled EMEAP meeting took place in Bangkok.  
Although the meeting did not prevent the subsequent contagion effect, nor anticipate the 
behaviour of the highly-leveraged institutions, it did mean that regional central banks were in 
a position to provide informed advice to their governments about the crisis as it unfolded.7  
The ongoing exchange of information was, to a certain extent, responsible for reducing 
uncertainty in the implementation of post-crisis financial planning. 
The need to more closely coordinate the recovery efforts led to the creation of the Manila 
Framework Group (MFG) in 1997. The MFG draws together central banks as well as finance 
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ministers from nine East Asian countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
United States.8  Its purpose is to provide a forum to discuss issues affecting regional financial 
stability. 
Both EMEAP and the MFG include East Asian as well as Western members.  However, 
with the development of ASEAN+3 there has been a marked strengthening of ties between 
the East Asian members of these organisations.  In 1999, Vietnam hosted the first of what 
has become an annual series of meetings of (what might be termed) the ASEAN+3 MFG; in 
other words, the Manila Framework Group members plus the missing East Asian members 
minus the Western participants (Chairman’s Statement 1999) .9  Regardless of the merits of 
such a group, its creation under ASEAN+3 auspices was indicative of a strong trend towards 
economic and financial regionalism under an established pan-Asian political structure. This 
ties the East Asian region into a distinct political-economic bloc but allows the maintenance 
of extra-regional ties. 
In addition to region-level initiatives, there have also been a number of sub-regional 
initiatives designed to promote regional integration in a more discreet setting. These 
initiatives include the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the ASEAN Investment Area, the 
development of regional growth triangles, an expansion of bilateral free trade areas between 
Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries, as well as the creation of sub-regional zones 
for multinational cooperation.  In many instances these sub-regional programs were already 
underway before the 1997 crisis.  However, they are worth examining as their structural 
objectives support and intensify regionalisation efforts in the other monetary sectors as well 
as in the political and social sectors. 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (or AFTA) is the most developed and inclusive of the 
subregional initiatives in East Asia.  AFTA was created in 1992 to promote intra-ASEAN 
trade.  Indeed it was only following the establishment of AFTA that there was an ASEAN 
policy of promoting the free movement of capital for enhancing economic cooperation.  Prior 
to this, ASEAN members made intraregional agreements for capital flows (Lawan 2000: 9-
10).  Following the crisis, AFTA was used to develop mechanisms to help restore stability by 
encouraging the use of ASEAN currencies for payment of traded goods and services.10  This 
mutual interdependence on regional currencies was designed to boost the currencies’ demand, 
reducing the impact of negative speculation. When examining the trade patterns of AFTA 
members it can be seen that intra-ASEAN trade has steadily increased since AFTA’s 
inception.  In part this can be attributed to improved economic performance in the member 
countries, coupled with readily accessible markets in close geographic proximity.  Moreover, 
the regulatory aspects of AFTA provides an overarching framework that encourages trade 
with other Southeast Asian states.11 
                                                        
8 Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam are not represented in the Group.  In addition 
Hong Kong is also a member - separate from China. 
9 Cambodia was not yet a full member of ASEAN so there was no Cambodian representative at the 
Hanoi meeting.  
10  As The Hanoi Declaration in part stated, “We encourage wider use of ASEAN currencies in 
intra-ASEAN trade settlements”.  See Paragraph 13 of The Hanoi Declaration. Sixth ASEAN Summit. 
Vietnam, Hanoi. 16 December 1998. 
11 This is not to say that intra-ASEAN trade is dominant.  Extra-AFTA trade (particularly with 
Europe and North America) far outweighs regional trading patterns.  However, intra-regional trade is 
increasing.  As a recent report noted, “Between 1993 and 2000, intra-ASEAN exports grew to 87.7 
billion US dollars from 43.26 billion dollars, while the bloc's total exports to all markets increased to 
696 billion dollars from 374 billion dollars” (Xinhua 2001). 





This is not to say that AFTA is without its problems.  Adherence to ASEAN’s principles 
of consensus and non-interference has meant that some countries have been able to retain 
preferential positions for selected domestic markets.  However, as Southeast Asian countries 
fully accede to the World Trading Organization these trade barriers will be removed.12  
Indeed global efforts toward trade liberalization offer an alternative option between 
balancing domestic imperatives and regional realities. Where regional and domestic concerns 
exist regarding market penetration by external actors, the global frameworks for 
liberalization offer a way to overcome these concerns without triggering national sensitivities. 
AFTA is supported by the operations of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
group. As Soesastro (2000) has noted the umbrella nature of APEC provides a sense of 
cohesiveness between the different subregional trade and investment initiatives. This helps 
prevent divisive problems arising, such as new forms of trade discrimination or the 
development of new sets of interests resistant to broader regional trade and investment 
liberalisation efforts (APEC, Second Report 1994).  However, there are limits to this claim. 
For APEC to function as a supranational ‘glue’ for subregional initiatives it needs to 
maintain a primary relevance for East Asia trading regimes.  Although APEC remains a 
highly relevant institution, it focuses on sustaining unilateral trade liberalisation rather than 
institutionalising region-wide free trade agreements (Soesastro 2000: 5). For those East 
Asian states for whom APEC does not produce substantive institutional cohesion, other 
regimes, such as political or security coalitions, may provide the additional impetus to 
generate a regional identity able to prevent these divisive problems from arising.13  The 
AFTA/APEC relationship is another example of deeper regional ties being balanced with 
membership in extra-regional organisations. 
Complementing ASEAN’s trade liberalisation scheme is the ASEAN Investment Area 
(AIA). The AIA, an outcome of the 1998 Hanoi Summit, is designed to “attract greater and 
sustainable levels of FDI into the region and to realize substantially increasing flows of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources” (Joint Press 
Release 1998).  As Lawan (2000: 26) noted, 
 
AIA thus indicates a new direction for ASEAN to balance deeper regional integration and 
“Open Regionalism”. While it enhances intra-ASEAN economic integration, it also opens the 
door to non-ASEAN investors.  Moreover, individual ASEAN countries have also unilaterally 
liberalised their trade and investment regime by keeping their margin of preference as low as 
they can so that market access is more available for non-ASEAN enterprises. 
 
Despite the fact that other forms of region-building have been expanded to include the 
Northeast Asian states, AFTA and its related programs (such as the AIA) remain ASEAN 
focused. However, expansion of AFTA is under consideration. Joint study groups are 
examining the benefits of joining AFTA in a Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) with 
Australia and New Zealand.  The most recent study of the proposal concluded that in excess 
of US$48 billion would be generated in goods and services between the two regions (Centre 
of International Economics, 2000:14). In addition, individual members of AFTA are 
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economies to removed protective trade barriers. 
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and reputation” (Agence France Press 2000). 
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discussing or have implemented free trade agreements (FTA) with external economies.  For 
example, Singapore already has an FTA with New Zealand and has agreed to abolish sectoral 
tariffs with Japan and is discussing the implementation of an FTA with Australia and the 
United States. 14  In addition, South Korea and Japan have begun talks to develop FTA 
between their two countries, which would be the first FTA in Northeast Asia (Kim 1998). 
Similar agreements exist with other AFTA members.  These types of bilateral efforts may 
result in another expansion of AFTA or they may remain at the bilateral level - further 
evidence of "open regionalism" coexisting with intra-regional efforts. 
The 1990s also witnessed the growth of other sub-regional initiatives, such as the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS) development project as well as the creation of ‘growth triangles’.  
Growth triangles are an attempt to create capital for three countries either by tapping into an 
existing resource and infrastructure base whose benefits can be spread across a transborder 
region or by identifying areas of potential resource development. 15  These triangles are 
important for wider regionalisation efforts as they not only have a direct impact on their 
operating zones but also stimulate positive flow on effects in neighbouring areas.   
The Greater Mekong Subregion project involves a deeper commitment from members 
than is the case with growth triangles.16  The potential in the GMS has long been recognized 
but it has only been in the last decade that socio-political conditions enabled the integrative 
process to proceed.17  Working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) the countries in the project identify areas of 
cooperation across seven areas - transport, energy, telecommunications, environmental, 
human resource development, trade and investment, and tourism.18 Although there is no 
GMS Secretariat the number of ministerial summits, Senior Official Meetings and related 
fora encourages a high degree of policy cooperation between participating states.  Hence, the 
integration between the GMS members represents a compressed form of what is occurring in 
the wider ASEAN+ area. 
Subregional cooperative efforts form strong bases for wider regional integration, as they 
encourage small-scale transnational development to take place that would not otherwise 
occur (Haryati 2001). In many respects, the challenges faced by these projects mirror broader 
regional issues.  First, given wide social, economic and political disparities the benefits may 
be unequally distributed between participating countries. Second, states have to provide 
long-term commitment to the project’s objectives (Tan et al 1995:  238).  This means that 
participating states have to willingly accept constraints on their ability to allocate resources - 
a key aspect of state sovereignty. In addition, both the growth triangles and the GMS are 
heavily dependent on private sector investment. This raises issues of government 
transparency and accountability in providing accurate information to investors. In some cases 
regional governments are not accustomed to providing timely economic and financial data, 
                                                        
14 On the recent Singapore-Japan negotiations see: Japan Today, 2001. 
15 Examples of growth triangles include - the Greater Southern China Economic Zone (PRC, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan), the Singapore-Johore-Riau (SIJORI) triangle, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
(IMT) triangle and the Tumen River triangle (Siberia province, Russia, the DPRK and Jilin province, 
PRC) (Tang, 1995). 
16 The six members of the GMS are: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and Yunnan 
province, PRC. 
17 As early as 1957 a report was issued by the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of 
the Lower Mekong Basin.  This report focused on the economic complementarity between Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. 
18 For detailed overview on the GMS, see: www.adb.org/gms. 





and may even regard such information as secret. Although this change can be seen as an 
encroachment on state sovereignty the added value of the subregional initiatives encourages 
governments to change management practices and adopt new governance policies, for 
example, in the harmonization and standardization of customs procedures to facilitate 
subregional trade and investment.19   
In addition to the development of the ASEAN+3 MFG and the various sub-regional 
initiatives, there have also been a number of proposals whose long-term impact will be to 
bind East Asian economies and states even closer together into an integrated arrangement.  
These proposals include renewed calls for an Asian Monetary Fund and a common currency. 
Japan’s calls for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), similar in function to the IMF, were 
amongst the first set of proposals for a sustained regional response to the crisis.  At the time, 
it was vigorously opposed by the United States who perceived it as a way for countries to 
escape the strict conditionality that were part of the IMF rescue packages. Recently, however, 
this proposal has reemerged for serious discussion with the ASEAN+ context. 
In May 2000, as an interim move towards establishing the AMF, ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers agreed to extend a currency swap arrangement to all 13 member countries. 
Previously it had only covered Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Singapore.20 How this currency swap arrangement will develop into a Monetary Fund has 
not yet been clarified.  However, it is worth noting that the original proposal for an AMF was, 
in part, supported by a currency swap arrangement. The Malaysian Finance Minister of the 
time,  Mustapha Mohamed, said, “It can evolve into something.  But there was not discussion 
of what it was going to be” (Cheeseman 2000: 14). Despite the ASEAN+3 agreement there 
remains opposition from China - concerned about issues of financial sovereignty - as well as 
from other Southeast Asian countries wary of the expansion of Japanese economic power.   
The regional currency swap can also be seen as the first step in the eventual creation of 
an Asian currency. The opening move in developing this single Asian currency was put 
forward in October 1998 by (then) Japanese Minister of Finance Miyazawa Kiichi who 
called for Asian currencies to be pegged to a basket of the yen, dollar and euro. Although 
there was only a lukewarm response to that aspect of the Miyazawa Initiative, an alternate 
option - the rapid internationalisation of the yen had a better reception within Southeast Asia 
(Virabongsa 1999). 
The implementation of such plan remains technically difficult. Undoubtedly, the rapid 
internationalisation of the yen would improve the economic outlook of all East Asian 
economies. The World Bank Annual Report 1999 noted “A Japanese recovery is crucial to 
the stabilization and prosperity of Asian economies.” However, despite any improvement in 
Japan’s economic situation, the US economy is likely to remain vibrant enough for its dollar 
to be attractive to regional and international markets.21  Until this situation changes any 
                                                        
19 On this point, with reference to the GMS, see the proceedings of Ministerial, Forums and 
Working groups meetings held at http://www.adb.org/GMS/gmsproc.asp 
20 A currency swap arrangement is where a number of countries agree to purchase each other’s 
currencies to reduce the impact of speculators as well as abrupt shortfalls in the value of a particular 
currency in the arrangement. 
21 Moreover, there remain substantial questions as to (1) whether the qualitative gains for such a 
regional basket would offset the political and administrative costs of such a decision, (2) whether or not 
the advantages would be enjoyed by all member economies, and (3) if the possible inflationary effects 
would be manageable (Ohno 1999). 
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attempt to ‘force’ the development of a yen bloc would cause macroeconomic stresses in all 
regional economies. 
Given that, a trend towards deepening regional integration across a multiplicity of sectors, 
some form of currency union appears inevitable.  First, it is more likely that East Asian states 
would prefer adopting a currency union rather than moving toward a yen bloc. The former 
option would give all member states an (in principle) equal say in monetary affairs whereas 
the adoption of the yen would take a large part of monetary policy (and with it the Keynesian 
control of their national economies) away from subscribing states and place it in the hands of 
the Japanese government. As has already been noted, this would be a highly difficult position 
for many regional states to accept. Second, in an area of deepening ties a currency union 
would result in substantial savings when undertaken in tandem with free trade agreements, 
harmonisation of educational and legal standards, and liberalized labour and migration laws 
(Brash 2000). However, the wide economic disparities between the ASEAN+ members 
coupled with their differences toward economic sovereignty and openness mean that the 
adoption of any such measure is likely to be a considerable time away.  Hence, it is probable 
that in the short to medium term, the existing arrangements will be strengthened (even 
incurring some opportunity costs) before a transition to a more integrated pact can be agreed 
upon in the long term. 
In East Asian relations, economics cannot be divorced from politics. Movements in one 
sphere reverberate in the other. When considering whether or not an East Asian 
C/community is feasible, it is necessary to consider both the political and economic aspects 
of regional integration.  With that in mind, this article now turns to an analysis of East Asian 
forms of political regionalism. 
 
2.2.3.  The Third Wave of Political and Social Regionalism 
 
Economic and financial cooperation between East Asian countries is important. When 
looking at the question of the third wave of regionalism, however it is necessary to go 
beyond traditional, non-contentious areas of cooperation. This section examines new 
cooperative efforts in political, social and security arenas. It will be shown that what is taking 
place in regional economic and financial circles at the regional and sub-regional levels and 
across functional sectors is being mirrored in the intercourse of political elites, civil society 
and security dialogues.   
The most significant development in regional politics is the expansion of the ASEAN 
leaders, senior officials and officials meetings to include their Northeast Asian counterparts.  
This expansion is known as ASEAN +3. The expansion of the ASEAN dialogues to include 
the three key states of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) indicated a 
political recognition that the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia was tied to the 
political economies to the north (Alwi 2000). 
Although the first ASEAN+3 Informal Summit (Hanoi 1998) did not attract all regional 
leaders it did lead to the formation of a regional eminent persons group (the East Asia Vision 
Group, EAVG) whose brief was to “discuss the direction of mid and long term cooperation 
in the region [as well as] specific regional cooperative activities.”22  The EAVG, proposed by 
                                                        
22 East Asian Vision Group press release. Seoul. October 1999. [...] added for grammatical reasons.  
It is worth noting that the first Informal Summit dealing with ASEAN+3 issues was actually the second 
Informal Summit.  The first “Informal” was held in 1996 and was targeted at those Southeast Asian 





South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, will develop several interim reports identifying areas 
for enhanced cooperation in East Asia before submitting a final report to regional leaders in 
the later half of 2001.  As a Korea Herald piece noted, this report will identify “ways to 
foster a common East Asian identity for the countries of the region” (September 1999).  The 
explicit purpose behind identifying these aspects of a common Asian identity is to develop a 
platform “towards a higher level of region-wide cooperation and integration” (Hong 1999a).  
The strength of the EAVG is that, as a second track clearinghouse, proposals for regional 
cooperation can be discussed without negatively impacting on official policies of member 
states.  Importantly, in this fashion, the EAVG assists the process of regional integration but 
ensures that the process is in accordance with the consensual manner of ASEAN decision-
making. 
It was at the second ASEAN+3 Informal Summit, in Manila 1999, that the ASEAN+3 
process emerged as a regional forum for East Asian countries.  In terms of region building 
this was a crucial milestone as it was the first time that all ASEAN Heads of State had been 
present together with the three Heads of State from Northeast Asia.23 Although the main 
focus of the 1999 Summit was the further development of economic and trade linkages, 
culture and information as well as security and social issues were also discussed. This shift 
moved regional collaborative efforts away from a narrow monetary focus to encompass a 
broad range of interrelated regional issues affecting East Asia (Surin 2000). 
In terms of region-building, the 1999 Summit was important in that it led to a mini-
Summit between the leaders of the three Northeast Asian states. Despite the fact that there 
have been increased bilateral and trilateral ties among Northeast Asian officials in the post-
1997 period, this was the first time the three Heads of State had met in a trilateral setting.  As 
former South Korean Trade Minister Hong Soon-young (1999b) indicated, this trilateral 
meeting process was seen as an important step in the development of an East Asian 
community: 
 
[T]he beginning years of the new century will see momentum for the trilateral cooperation 
further strengthened, so that the three countries can together serve as an active force for the 
building of the East Asian community in the 21st century. 
 
The third ASEAN+3 Informal Summit in Singapore (2000) advanced regional efforts at 
integration. Although focused on functional cooperation within the ASEAN+3 group 
(particularly on e-issues) the 2000 Summit generated the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, to 
promote faster regionalization efforts at the functional and subregional levels. The 2000 
Summit was also important for regional building efforts as all members agreed to push for 
representation of all East Asian countries in the APEC and ASEM processes.  Specifically, 
the Summit identified the inclusion of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar in the APEC Working 
Groups as priorities for the near term (Press Statement by Chairman 2000). This type of 
agreement is an example of different levels of East Asian regional groupings mutually 
developing and reinforcing a unified East Asian perception of political regionalism. 
                                                                                                                                               
countries, which at that time, were not members of ASEAN.  This followed the decision taken at the 
Fifth ASEAN Summit (Bangkok) in December 1995 to expand the membership to all ten Southeast 
countries.  For the purposes of this article, only the ASEAN+3 Informal Summits will be analysed.  
Hence, the first ASEAN+3 Summit (Hanoi) is actually the Second Informal Summit, and so on. 
23 Cambodia only became a member of ASEAN in April 1999.  
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It is through such Summits and meetings that a sense of regional community can develop.  
A similar process has also been observed in the case of European integration. These meetings 
lay the foundation for long term policy coordination between member states and, following 
the example of European integration, should intensify as the region moves closer. An 
example of this intensified policy coordination was seen immediately prior to the Manila 
summit when finance and economic ministers joined their foreign ministers counterparts to 
hold a Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM). The purpose of the JMM was to intensify the 
coordination between the different ministries “to ensure the region’s economic and sustained 
growth” (ASEAN Press Release 1999). 
Beneath the level of Summits, SOMs and other assorted state-to-state interactions, there 
has also been a concomitant spread of social networks throughout the region. Civil society 
organisations (CSOs), although historically state-based, has been developing in conjunction 
with the expansion in regional-level ties.  Although communities of interest already existed 
within different social sectors (such as the transnational women’s organisation, S isters of 
Islam) the creation of regional state-based networks has promoted the further spread of 
domestic organisations intent on reaching similar groups within their own epistemic 
communities. The development of these transnational networks further encourages East 
Asian regionalisation. The growth of these networks also provides an important validatory 
step for regionalism. A regional community cannot be established through political means 
alone.  It is necessary to engage civil society organisations and, through these organisations, 
individual citizens before a C/community can be established. 
In ASEAN, for example, there are currently 56 umbrella CSOs formally registered with 
the ASEAN Secretariat.24 These organisations range from student associations to healthcare 
organisations to Chambers of Commerce.  In each case the presence of ASEAN has aided the 
development of CSOs beyond their domestic environment. This is not to state that without 
ASEAN these organisations would not have otherwise developed but rather that the 
existence of a regional institution provided an overarching structure that facilitated (and 
directed) their development.  In addition to these formally recognized organisations there are 
many others that encompass either the ASEAN countries or operate within a subset of the ten 
countries. 
This process has also been replicated at the regional level between East Asia and Europe.  
The annual ASEM meetings have acted as a catalyst for civil society organisations with an 
interest in transregional affairs. There are now CSO meetings that shadow the main ASEM 
meeting and spinoff meetings have also been held.25 As with the ASEM political process, 
this social process involves CSOs from both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Just as ASEM 
was one stepping stone to broader regional engagement it may be that the emergence of civil 
society organisations centred on either ASEAN or ASEM will, in turn, assist in the 
development of an East Asian C/community.26  What can be concluded from this is that there 
is emerging a multiplicity of epistemic communities operating at a regional or sub-regional 
                                                        
24 See www.aseansec.org/ under ASEAN-Affiliated NGOs for a complete list of all organisations. 
25 In addition to these meetings commonalities of interests and issues (for example in the area of 
human rights) have also led to joint actions against European and Asian states by civil society 
organisations. 
26 One example of ASEAN promoting the development of a regional civil society organisation is 
The ASEAN People’s Assembly, which held its first meeting in 2000.  For additional information goto: 
http://www.siiaonline.org/news/news.htm 





level, whose presence provides a form of social regionalisation lacking in the state-level 
processes. 
Another arena that generates a sense of community is the ASEAN Regional Forum.  Prior 
to ASEAN +3 being fully realized in Manila, the ARF was the only forum whose members 
(excepting Dialogue partners) were drawn exclusively from East Asian countries.  The recent 
decision to admit North Korea to the ARF is indicative of the regional push to have all East 
Asian countries represented in the security forum. Supporting evidence for this push can be 
seen in two areas.  Firstly, there was and is a recognized position by the participants to limit 
membership of the Forum.  This was in place before the DPRK made its formal application 
to join.  Now that the DPRK is a member this decision to consolidate the organisation will 
now be enforced. Second, the DPRK was admitted over 17 other extra-regional countries that, 
in some cases, have both long-standing applications to become Dialogue partners as well as 
strong cases for membership, such as Pakistan.27   
Another functional example of the deepening integration in Southeast Asia is the ARF 
Troika. Within the ASEAN membership this new body has the capacity to act to resolve 
problems as they arise.  However, given ASEAN’s track record in conflict resolution as well 
as the twinned supremacy of consensus and non-interference, “the efficacy of such a 
mechanism is in grave doubt” (Ching 2000).  Despite these doubts it must be recognized that 
the Troika mechanism is an intermediate point between having no formal avenue for conflict 
resolution between ASEAN members and the establishment of the ASEAN High Council.   
Furthermore, even when the efficacy of the ARF to achieve security resolutions is in doubt 
its utility as another second-track forum that allows regional and extra-regional participants 
to discuss issues of transregional concern must be acknowledged. 
That said, it is clear that the ARF needs to improve upon its institutional capacity for 
developing confidence building measures and regional cooperation, if it is to remain a viable 
mechanism for encouraging regional integration. On issues such as defence cooperation there 
remain degrees of mistrust between members and dialogue partners. Moreover, there has 
been no concerted effort under the ARF umbrella to tackle such regional security issues as 
drug trafficking, arms smuggling or piracy. Working groups within CSCAP are addressing 
these issues but they lack the support of all member states.  Even when faced with regional 
security problems such as peacekeeping in Cambodia and East Timor the ARF has required 
external assistance. Proposals to address these institutional failings include the formation of a 
secretariat to coordinate ARF activities and the development of a peacekeeping training 
centre to better equip regional policy-makers and military personnel in maintaining security 
and stability (Naidu 2000).  However these shortcomings are addressed, to remain a credible 
forum for discussing multilateral concerns the ARF needs to move away from “loose 
regionalism” and implement policy initiatives that secure the region in a more robust manner 
(Weatherbee 1997). 
These are the economic, financial, political, social, and strategic agreements and ideas 
that are shaping the East Asian region in this ‘third wave’ of regionalization.  Inasmuch as 
these regional efforts at institution-building are important it is also necessary to examine the 
structural impediments existing in these processes.  It is clear from the preceding analysis 
                                                        
27 In the case of Pakistan, intra-regional politics comes into play.  India, a Dialogue partner, wants 
Pakistan to be excluded from higher membership.  Despite support from some ASEAN countries the 
motion to extend an invitation to Pakistan was not tabled, primarily because India has quite close ties 
with Vietnam - which opposed the application. (Reyes 2000; Peters 2000) 
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that different integrative resources are being allocated to different regional levels and 
functional areas.  What this means for the development of an East Asian C/community and 
the states that would comprise it are the topics of the following section. 
 
 
3. CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING AN EAST ASIAN C/cOMMUNITY 
 
What shape the East Asian C/community will take in this third wave of regionalism 
depends on the different views of the member states.  In East Asia different regional states 
vary considerably in their preference for the model of engagement. Japan, for example, has 
“officially opposed the formation of exclusive trading blocs and encouraged western 
countries to expand their relations with the Asian economies. Furthermore, Japan appears 
committed to the ‘open regionalism’ approach to economic cooperation and trade 
liberalization in Asia” (Lavergne 1995). Malaysia, at the other extreme, favours a defined 
East Asia regional community - similar to that of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) 
originally proposed by Dr. Mahathir. Although what is evolving in the region has been 
likened to the EAEC, it differs from Dr Mahathir’s proposal in one crucial aspect. The 
ASEAN+ process is being propounded as a mechanism for preventing regional instability 
and promoting regional prosperity whereas the EAEC proposal (which held similar goals) 
was subverted by anti-Western rhetoric. Either a balance will have to be found between these 
two opposing ideologies or the ideologies themselves will have to be rethought. 
In addition to ideological tensions there are also structural tensions.  Previous sections 
have shown that, despite some preferential trade barriers, trade and investment falls into the 
category of “open regionalism”, as does the ARF - with member countries joined to Dialogue 
partners. However, some forms of economic and financial integration as well as political 
forms of regionalism are far more exclusive than inclusive.   
From earlier analysis it is apparent that strategic choices over economic and financial 
wellbeing are the driving impetuses towards deeper regional integration. Ultimately a 
political decision, all East Asian countries are trying to avoid a repeat of the socio-economic 
fallout of the 1997 crisis. A delicate balance will need to be struck to achieve this objective.   
On one hand, there are quantifiable benefits from deepening regional integration.  These 
benefits range from lower labour costs to a larger, more diversified market to a more 
powerful voice in global affairs.   As South Korean President Kim Dae-jung said, 
 
I see a great deal of possibility in this ASEAN-plus-three group further expanding and 
further solidifying as a forum for East Asia as a whole …It will be able to speak for the region 
vis-à-vis the North American Free Trade Area, Latin America and the European Union, and 
engage these organizations in cooperation as well as in competition (Richardson 1999). 
 
On the other hand, any form of East Asian C/community will have to operate in an 
increasingly interconnected world. At both the regional and national level there will come a 
point where the costs of being exclusive will outweigh the benefits of being inclusive. The 
decisions stemming from these sets of choices will help determine the nature of the 
C/community. 
However, it should also be highlighted that in a global environment, the multilateral and 
multi-sectoral nature of any one state’s activities will mean that there will always be a need 
for extra-regional relations. Even when one country’s policy -makers might identify most 
closely with an exclusionary approach, the wide-ranging requirements of a nation-state will 





mean that non-regional agreements will have to be signed. Further, membership in such 
international organisations such as the United Nations, the WTO and APEC will encourage 
non-regional relationships to be formed. 
Whichever model is ultimately realized the ASEAN+ grouping will, at some stage, have 
to confront the issue of state versus regional sovereignty – in other words, the degree to 
which efforts towards regional integration encroach on state sovereignty.  This issue is 
intimately tied to ASEAN’s policy of non -interference, on which ASEAN remains most 
divided.  Of the ten members only Thailand and the Philippines have indicated support for an 
overarching body able to intervene in domestic processes. More conservative ASEAN 
members blocked calls from former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan for ‘flexible 
engagement’.  Similarly, efforts to establish  the ASEAN High Council as outlined in the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) have progressed more slowly than either the 
Thailand or the Philippines have indicated they would prefer. Although the ARF Troika 
represents a midway point to establishing a code of practice that would allow for a limited 
form of intervention into member’s domestic affairs , its ability to operate in an ASEAN 
environment may be limited. 
The expansion of ASEAN to include the three Northeast Asian states further complicates 
the sovereignty issue. China has always remained unequivocally opposed to any form of 
intrusion into its domestic affairs. North Korea has taken a similar position to China.  Neither 
South Korea nor Japan has ever had to confront this issue in a sustained manner in a public 
forum. However, nationalistic sentiment in both countries is an important aspect of domestic 
politics and it is unlikely that, in the medium term, politicians would be willing to risk a 
voter backlash by supporting such a measure. 
Regardless of the position each country takes on sovereignty, some tentative conclusions 
can already be made. Most noticeably, calls for increased multi-sector policy cooperation 
will ultimately have an impact on sovereignty. The more countries converge in policy the 
less room there will for them to act independently - without generating negative externalities 
in regional countries (that will, inevitably, affect the originating country).   
Second, the more policies are coordinated the greater will be the need for overarching 
frameworks to support policy initiatives and to minimize risk. This is already being seen (in 
early stages) between the six countries involved in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
development project. As ASEAN comes together to recognize common educational, health, 
and labour standards it will become necessary to have common political and legal 
frameworks. If there are common frameworks, then there will need to be some form of 
regulatory system to prevent abuse of the system by any one state or subgroup of states 
(Lawan 2000: 89-91). It may not be necessary to create a common legal system, as Europe 
has done, but there will need to be checks and balances maintained. This is a common part of 
all ASEAN+ countries’ political, economic, social and legal system s, and fully in line with 
ASEAN commitments to good governance underpinned by greater transparency and 
accountability in public affairs.  Ultimately, the ASEAN+ region will choose its own path 
determined by the unique experiences of its member countries rather than follow a path 











East Asia is coming together, and has been for some time.  This trend has been more 
pronounced in Southeast Asia than in the North - where the cold war rivalries that prevented 
the development of a regional bloc are only now beginning to subside. The regional nature of 
the Asian Financial Crisis further encouraged the development of an East Asian organisation.  
The lack of a Northeast Asian regional bloc as well as the diffuse nature of APEC meant that 
ASEAN was best placed to evolve into a pan-regional organisation by expanding its Informal 
membership to include the countries of Northeast Asia.   
In developing a regional structure beyond ASEAN, tensions have emerged in determining 
what is the best model of regional formation which encompasses all the involved countries.  
The different models being espoused by regional elites can be narrowed down to a choice 
between both intra- and extra-regional ties.  At present, there is no clear majority in favour of 
either model.  To further complicate the debate, different sectoral representatives within the 
regional countries promote different models of integration. However, whatever form this 
union ultimately takes some preliminary conclusions can be drawn as follows.   
First, there is a widely-held belief that the socio-economic structures in each of these 
countries should never again be afflicted as badly as has occurred for the past three years. 
Interdependence, pre-1997, was viewed in a positive light. The regional consensus is now 
that although such integration is inevitable it was flawed by a lack of focused coordination 
between member countries. In order to overcome these systemic flaws it is necessary to 
expand existing networks and develop new organisational relationships.  As the root causes 
of the crisis were financial and economic it is these issues that these networks and 
relationships need to address. Regionwide efforts in these areas mean that it is likely 
economic and financial regionalism will take priority over other areas.   
Second, economic and financial issues led to problems in the social sector.  These social 
issues not only have the capacity to spill over into other countries but can also resonate in the 
political sector as well as cause secondary effects in the economic and financial sectors.  As 
no single regional country has the capacity to deal with these issues, a collaborative approach 
remains the only rational option.  
Third, the increasing number of state-to-state linkages being formed by the policy-
making communities in member countries is an important step in forming a regional 
C/community.  However, it is also necessary that social ties be enhanced.  To a limited extent 
this is already happening within an ASEAN and an ASEM context. These may help create 
ASEAN+ ties between different civil society organisations and individual citizens. There is a 
precedent for this in the development of political ties but it remains to be seen if the same 
process will occur at the social level between Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
Fourth, the West is being sidelined from directly participating in this process. This has 
led to the creation of organisations solely comprised of East Asians that mirror pre-existing 
groups that include both East Asian and non-East Asian representatives.  These organisations 
are reflected of a broad attitudinal change that has taken place in regional elites - of East 
Asians looking after East Asia.  As Sopiee (1999) put it, 
 
Whether we like it or not, we, in East Asia, are tarred by the same brush; we are all in the 
same boat.  If the boat sinks, we all go under.  If it prospers we all prosper together.  We sink 
and we swim together. 
 





Finally, the title of this article asks whether an East Asian Community or community is 
possible. From the preceding analysis, it can be concluded that a community is definitely 
possible. Indeed, it is already taking shape.  Within this community, the trappings of a more 
institutionalized Community can be seen.  The faster pace of regional integration at the state-
level, supported by intense forms of sub-regional integration, both of which are bolstered by 
functional cooperation between private and civil sector organizations all seem to be leading 
to an East Asian Community. Such a development will have a long lead time. Quite 
fundamental interests relating to national sovereignty and identity will have to first be dealt 
with in most regional countries and societies for this to take place.  This will be neither a 
quick nor easy issue to resolve. In fact, it may not even be desirable to raise it given the 
disruptive effect such a debate would likely generate.  Moreover, the emergence of an East 
Asian Community will likely be uniquely located in the cultural and historical processes of 
the region.  In the end what determines how the region evolves will be the commitment of 
regional members to achieve long-term prosperity and stability together rather than alone.  
As the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jia-xuan remarked: 
 
To carry out regional cooperation on this land of diversity of East Asia is an unprecedently 
great undertaking.  The road is long and the task arduous for safeguarding stability, enhancing 
cooperation and promoting development. Let us join hands and forge ahead together for the 
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